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Abstract 
 
The research reported in this paper was conducted under the project The Social 
Impacts of Environmental Taxes: Removing Regressivity, funded by the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation under its Programme on Environment and Social Concerns. 
The project is investigating the social implications of environmental taxes and 
charges in relation to four environmental issues – the household use of energy, water, 
and transport, and the generation of waste. This is a report of the component on the 
household use of energy. 
 
Energy use by, and carbon emissions from, UK households are rising. A contributing 
factor is that household energy prices are relatively low, so that households have little 
incentive to implement the energy efficiency measures which are cost effective even at 
these low prices. The hypothesis underlying the first stage of the research was that the 
incentives to implement these measures could be increased by imposing a carbon tax 
on the household use of energy, and that redistribution through the benefit system of 
some or all of the revenues from the tax could prevent low-income households being 
made worse off. 
 
The research early established that there is enormous variation in household energy 
use within income deciles. In fact, those at the 80
th percentile in the lowest decile 
consume nearly nine times as much energy as the 20
th percentile of the decile, and 
more than twice as much energy as those at the 20
th percentile in the highest decile 
(Table 2.2). The variation in carbon emissions is not as great, but is still very 
substantial. It also emerged that poor households pay substantially more per unit of 
energy than rich households: the median price for those in the tenth decile was 
2.67p/kWh, compared to 3.66p/kWh, 37% more, for those in the first decile. A carbon 
tax imposed equally on rich and poor households, without any compensation for poor 
households, would therefore be very regressive and would add to the unfair price 
burden these households are already experiencing. 
 
A variety of ways of compensating poor households was explored, using means-tested 
benefits, child benefit, adjustments to pensioners’ Winter Fuel Allowance (WFA) and  
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varying the rate of carbon tax. The results of these various compensation scenarios, 
described fully in the text, are given in Table 3.16. 
 
The first point to be made is that for the lowest decile all the tax plus compensation 
packages are progressive on average (that is, the average household is a net gainer). 
The amounts gained range from £1.77 per year to £118.14 per year. The same is true 
for Deciles 2 and 3, except in respect of one scenario when, not surprisingly, nearly 
all pensioner households lose out from the redistribution of some of their WFA to 
non-pensioner low-income households. Essentially these results substantiate the 
hypothesis on which this research was based, namely that it is possible to make a 
carbon tax such as that imposed progressive for the average household in the lowest 
deciles. 
 
However, the enormously skewed distribution of energy consumption within the 
income deciles, noted above, means that the average result conceals great differences 
in net gains and losses within each decile. In fact, it can be seen from Table 3.16 that 
none of the compensation packages manage to reduce the proportion of losing Decile 
1 households much below 20%, and the five that do get slightly below this figure all 
assume a 100% take up of the relevant means-tested benefits, which is clearly unlikely 
to be achieved. With the take up of benefits at current (partial) rates, none of the 
compensation methods reduces the proportion of all households in Decile 1 which 
lose out much below 35%.  
 
This stage of the research has therefore shown that, although redistributing the 
revenues from a carbon tax through means-tested benefits would certainly be 
progressive overall, and would bring some households out of fuel poverty, it does not 
seem to be possible to devise a means of doing it that would not also worsen fuel 
poverty for those who are already most badly affected by it. This makes it politically 
problematic at best, and probably politically infeasible. 
 
There are a number of Government programmes seeking to insulate the homes of low-
income households in order to reduce, and ultimately abolish, fuel poverty. One 
response to the results reported above would be to continue with, or intensify, these 
programmes, and to return to the issue of imposing a carbon tax to incentivise the  
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take up of energy efficiency measures once the fuel poverty problem had been 
substantially addressed. This would amount to accepting a rise in household carbon 
emissions over at least the next ten years, which is hardly compatible with the 
ambitious carbon-reduction targets to which the Government says it is committed. 
 
An alternative approach would be to introduce incentives for non-fuel poor 
households to introduce cost effective energy efficiency measures. The paper explores 
a means of doing this through the Council Tax and Stamp Duty. Starting with the 
highest value houses in each region, the scheme set out would impose surcharges on 
the Council Tax of those households which failed to implement cost effective energy 
efficiency measures within a year of receiving a notification to this effect. A Stamp 
Duty surcharge adopting the same approach would encourage householders to install 
such measures when moving into a new home. 
 
Implementation of such a scheme would save a minimum of 10% of household carbon 
emissions. The measures would cost householders £6.4 billion, but would save them a 
net present value of £19.7 billion. The average rate of return to householders would 
be 23%. A number of practical details of the scheme are discussed in the paper. 
Overall, it would result in the whole housing stock being brought up to a cost effective 
level of energy efficiency over 10 years, greatly reducing fuel poverty, as well as 
saving carbon emissions, in the process. Over the subsequent ten years a further 
programme could concentrate on hard-to-heat homes (such as those with solid walls) 
which would still be excessively energy intensive. The programme could be financed 
through a carbon tax imposed on those homes that had already been insulated (with 
redistribution through the benefit system now being able effectively to compensate 
those on low incomes). Twenty years after the beginning of the process the UK 
housing stock would have been brought up to the level of efficiency to match the rest 
of Northern Europe. Fuel poverty would be a phenomenon of the past. Carbon 
emissions would be substantially reduced. And most householders would be 
financially better off because of their more efficient use of energy, even taking the 
carbon tax into account. 
 
Few other public policies have such a positive overall generation and distribution of 
economic, social and environmental benefits. It is an indication of the low political  
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priority that is still given to climate change that such a scheme is still not being given 
serious political consideration. 
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1. Introduction 
 
UK households in 2000 produced 23.4 million tonnes of carbon (mtc) emissions from 
their direct use of fossil fuels and another 18.0 mtc if emissions from their use of 
electricity are taken into account, giving a total of 41.4 mtc (DEFRA, 2002). 
Moreover, their energy use, and their carbon emissions are still growing, by 1.6% and 
0.8% respectively in 2000 and by 3.9% and 4.6% respectively in 2001 (Cambridge 
Econometrics, 2002.). Between 1990 and 2000 their direct fossil fuel use grew by 
13.3% (an average annual rate of 1.25% p.a.) and their carbon emissions from this 
source by 8.8% (a lower rate of growth because of the shift from coal to less carbon-
intensive gas). Household electricity use grew by 16.5% over 1990-2000. Carbon 
emissions from this use of electricity fell, however, by 24.2%, because of the shift in 
power generation from coal to gas. With household energy demand still growing, and 
with limited possibilities for further fuel switching in either power generation or the 
direct household use of fossil fuels, household carbon emissions are likely to grow 
still further in future. A recent forecast from Cambridge Econometrics (2002) 
suggests that direct household emissions in 2010 will be 14.1% higher than in 2000, 
and those from household electricity use 6.1% higher. This is obviously problematic 
in terms of the Government’s commitment to reduce carbon emissions by 20% from 
the 1990 value by 2010, and from a perspective that attaches any kind of importance 
to reducing the emissions that contribute to climate change. 
 
In order to give incentives for households to increase their energy efficiency, a 
number of European countries have introduced household carbon or energy taxes. The 
four Nordic countries, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy all introduced carbon taxes 
on household energy during the 1990s.  
 
However, the UK has a problem that is not faced by other North European countries: 
fuel poverty, a term used to describe a situation whereby a household would need to 
spend more than 10% of its income on heating in order to obtain an adequate level of 
warmth. A major contributing factor to fuel poverty is the poor thermal characteristics 
of the UK housing stock. It is because of a desire not to exacerbate fuel poverty that  
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the present UK Government has made a repeated commitment (e.g. HMT 2002b) not 
to tax the household use of energy. 
 
Rather than tax the household use of energy, the UK Government has implemented 
two major programmes to try to increase household energy efficiency. They are both 
focused either partly or entirely on tackling the problem of fuel poverty,. One, Warm 
Front (formerly called the New Home Energy Efficiency Scheme) is specifically 
targeted at households in receipt of an income-related benefit that are considered 
particularly vulnerable (elderly, disabled or with children). The other major scheme, 
the Energy Efficiency Commitment is targeted 50% at households on benefits. 
Targeting energy efficiency improvements at the poorest is a way of attempting to 
reach those most likely to be in fuel poverty, but the ‘rebound’ effect where much of 
the improvements in efficiency is taken in increased comfort means that only about 
half the efficiency gains translate into reductions in carbon emissions (Henderson et 
al. 2003). Neither EEC nor Warm Front will have any effect on the great majority of 
households. They have two flaws: they do not reach a large proportion of those in fuel 
poverty who are deemed insufficiently poor or vulnerable, and they do not reach 
many non-poor households, which are the ones that use most energy. It is clear that 
current Government policy will do little to curb the growth of emissions from 
households, much less reduce them.  
 
At the same time it is also clear from research into previous energy efficiency 
schemes that much investment in household energy efficiency is cost effective at 
current energy prices. Cost effectiveness is defined by the government as payback 
within the lifetime of the measure with a discount rate of 7%. Figures from the Energy 
Saving Trust suggest that there is a huge potential for cost-effective measures that are 
not being taken up (EST 2001). However, despite the potential financial gains, 
households generally do not currently invest in the full range of cost-effective energy-
efficiency technologies, for a range of reasons that have been extensively studied and 
are now generally well understood (EST 2002). It is clear that securing carbon 
emission reductions, rather than growth, from households to 2010 and beyond could 
result in net financial benefits rather than costs, but that these benefits will not 
materialise by themselves. Further policy measures will be needed to achieve them. It 
is the purpose of this paper to describe a policy approach which could have this result,  
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and then keep carbon emissions stable or on a declining path, while seeking to ensure 
that those on low incomes are not unfairly affected. There are two aspects to that. The 
first is to avoid regressivity (a situation in which those on lower incomes are left 
proportionately worse off by a policy change than those on higher incomes). The 
second is to avoid worsening fuel poverty. There is a distinction between the two 
objectives, as will become clearer later. 
 
The starting motivation for the research on which this paper is based was that it is 
important to do something to improve household energy efficiency and reduce carbon 
emissions from domestic energy consumption. The research was designed to examine 
whether and how a carbon/energy tax, and other economic instruments, could be used 
to achieve this, whilst ensuring that those on low incomes are not made worse off. It is 
not the purpose of this paper to give a lengthy justification for the reasons in principle 
for considering the use of economic instruments, as they are already well known.  
 
In contrast to the UK Government’s position, the initial hypothesis of the research 
was that a carbon tax could be used to incentivise the increase of household energy 
efficiency, encouraging householders to implement available cost effective energy 
efficiency measures. Furthermore, because the tax would fall on both the rich and 
poor, the research sought to show that the poor could be compensated by distributing 
the tax revenues, through the benefit system or otherwise, in such a way that the tax 
would not leave them worse off financially, and would therefore not increase fuel 
poverty. Because the poor would not be exempt from the tax, the compensation 
mechanism would not remove from them the tax’s incentive not to waste energy.  
 
The first research task was an investigation of the distribution by income decile of UK 
domestic energy expenditure, use and carbon emissions, the results of which are 
described in Section 2. Section 3 examines the workability of combining a carbon tax 
to encourage emission reductions with compensation through the benefits system or 
exemptions from the tax for low- income households. It comes to the conclusion that, 
because of the extreme variation in the energy use of low-income households, and 
contrary to the initial hypothesis of the research, it is not possible to provide effective 
compensation to low-income households for the tax in the way that had been 
envisaged. The corollary is that, if the issue of carbon emissions from non-poor  
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households, as well as that of fuel poverty, is to be addressed, it will have to be 
through a different policy approach. 
 
Section 4 of the paper describes a possible National Home Energy Efficiency 
Programme that adopts such an approach, tackling fuel poverty through public 
spending (in an intensification of present programmes), and incentivising private 
investment in energy efficiency through economic policy instruments. The nature and 
effects of instruments that could improve household energy efficiency to a currently 
cost-effective level, and then maintain it at that level, are explored in detail, and the 
associated carbon emissions reduction calculated. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The distribution of household energy expenditure 
 
With a tax that raises revenues from both rich and poor households, it is clearly 
possible to compensate those on low incomes on average for the tax, but whether it is 
possible to compensate all those on low incomes depends on the distribution of their 
energy use. To explore this issue modelling has been conducted with two different 
datasets – the 1996 English House Condition Survey (EHCS) and the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) of 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. The EHCS provides 
information about the gas and electricity consumption of households; the FES 
provides more up-to-date data on households’ expenditure on them. The FES data can 
be used in a model combining data about household expenditure and the tax and 
benefits system. It enables one to address the question of whether it would be possible 
to use the income raised from a domestic carbon tax to increase low incomes 
sufficiently that even those most in fuel poverty (i.e. needing to spend most on energy 
in relation to their incomes) would be no worse off financially than before. 
 
The purpose of doing the work with the EHCS was in order to examine the 
distribution of energy consumption across the income deciles and compare it with the 
distribution of energy expenditure and the gross effect of a carbon tax before 
compensation mechanisms are incorporated.  
  
9   
There are two ways of comparing incomes across the deciles. The simplest way is to 
use the actual income, but it takes no account of household size. A fairer method is to 
calculate the ‘equivalent’ income, where each household’s income is adjusted to so 
that it is considered equivalent to the standard of living that a two-adult household 
would have on the equivalent income. There are a number of equivalent income 
scales. PSI generally uses the Bradmill equivalent income scale, but calculations done 
for us with the POLIMOD model of the tax and benefits system used the McClements 
equivalent income scale. The two scales are only slightly different and give similar 
results. 
 
Table 2.1  Income deciles in the English house condition survey 1996 
 
Decile Income  £  Equivalent income
1 £ 
1  0 - 4633.55  0- 5799.80 
2  4633.55 - 5773.52  5799.80 - 7030.11 
3  5773.52 - 6936.00  7030.11 - 8008.31 
4  6936.00 - 8260.00  8008.31 - 9023.25 
5  8260.00 - 9927.90  9023.25 - 10148.73 
6  9927.90 - 12213.58  10148.73 - 11694.36 
7  12213.58 - 14863.38  11694.36- 13694.47 
8  14863.38 - 18747.28  13694.47 - 16747.80 
9  18747.28 – 24365.00  16747.80 - 21986.08 
10  24365.00 -   21986.08 -  
 
Source: EHCS 1996 
 
2.1.  Comparing household energy use and incomes 
 
2.1.1 Non-equivalent  incomes 
 
Regression analysis using the EHCS shows that the correlation between energy use 
and household income is 0.171, so 17.1% of the variance in energy use is related to 
variation in household income.  
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Analysis also shows that the variation between the deciles is less than variation within 
the deciles, even when incomes are not adjusted for household size. A very small 
number of households with enormous energy consumption distort the mean, so 
medians are quoted instead. Table 2.2 shows that median energy consumption (total 
of gas and electricity) rises more or less steadily through the deciles from 11566 kWh 
in the first decile (those on lowest incomes) to 24176 kWh in the eighth decile and 
sharply to 29660 kWh in the ninth decile. However, the median masks enormous 
variation within the deciles. The median across the entire sample is 18244 kWh; 
nearly 30% of households in the first decile consume more, while over 30% of 
households in the ninth decile and nearly 30% of those in the tenth decile consume 
less. A startling fact to emerge from Table 2.2 is that those at the 80
th percentile in the 
lowest decile consume nearly nine times as much energy as the 20
th percentile of the 
decile, and more than twice as much energy as those at the 20
th percentile in the 
highest decile. 
 
Table 2.2  Household energy use by income decile in 1996 (non-equivalent 
incomes) 
 
Energy use (kWh) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 2700  11566  23317 
2 4132  12803  20539 
3 4645  14675  23695 
4 5156  16198  27422 
5 7244  18719  30839 
6 6794  18592  29729 
7 5708  20187  29915 
8 8407  21081  31974 
9 12038  24176  34227 
10 10296  29660  44330 
 
Source: EHCS 1996 
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2.1.2 Equivalent  incomes 
 
When household incomes are adjusted for household size and composition in line 
with the Bradmill equivalent income scale, a rather different pattern emerges. The 
correlation between energy use and equivalised income is 0.081, so only 8.1% of the 
variance in energy use is explained by variation in equivalised income. 
 
Table 2.3 shows that the median consumption starts at 16880 kWh in the first decile, 
bobs up and down slightly through the second to the seventh deciles, but rises sharply 
to 20009 kWh in the eighth decile and reaches 23272 kWh in the tenth decile. The 
pattern of the median through the deciles is remarkably flat, although it does rise 
somewhat in the higher deciles. Those at the 80
th percentile in the lowest decile now 
consume nearly six times as much energy as the 20
th percentile of the decile (as 
opposed to nine times in Table 2.2), but more than three and a half as much energy as 
those at the 20
th percentile in the highest decile. 
 
Table 2.3  Household energy use by income decile in 1996 (equivalent 
incomes) 
Energy use (kWh) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 4978  16880  29729 
2 4997  16679  28969 
3 5394  17115  27832 
4 5278  15961  27648 
5 5910  16946  26287 
6 7328  18703  29301 
7 5421  17452  27964 
8 6349  20009  32626 
9 7742  21562  34692 
10 8260  23272  38242 
Source: EHCS 1996  
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2.2.  Comparing household carbon dioxide emissions and income 
 
2.2.1 Non-equivalised  incomes 
 
In order to examine the distributional effect of a simple carbon tax, the carbon dioxide 
emissions from households’ electricity and gas consumption were examined. The 
carbon dioxide emissions were calculated using the appropriate conversion factors for 
the carbon dioxide emissions for each kilowatt-hour of gas or electricity consumption. 
Since poorer households are less likely to use gas for heating and gas is less carbon-
intensive than electricity, it was expected that lower deciles’ carbon dioxide emissions 
would be found to be more relatively higher than their energy consumption. It turned 
out that was not the case because electricity consumption tends to rise with income. 
Regression analysis gave exactly the same correlation between carbon dioxide 
emissions and income as between energy use and income – 0.182, so 18.2% of 
variance in carbon dioxide emissions is explained by variation in household income. 
 
The median carbon dioxide emissions per household were 4470 kg. Without 
controlling for household size and composition, these rose steadily from a median of 
3039 kg in the first decile to 5908 kg in the ninth decile and sharply to 7064 kg in the 
tenth decile. Again, nearly 30% of households in the first decile emitted more than the 
median across the entire distribution, while over 30% of households in the ninth 
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Table 2.4  Household carbon emissions by income decile in 1996 (non-
equivalent incomes) 
     Carbon  dioxide  emissions  (kg) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 919  3039  5118 
2 1293  3069  4745 
3 1659  3609  5440 
4 1725  4163  6035 
5 2373  4581  6796 
6 2376  4606  6893 
7 2306  4995  7170 
8 2918  5182  7584 
9 3323  5907  8305 
10 3434  7064  10515 
 
Source: EHCS 1996 
 
2.2.2 Equivalent  incomes 
 
When household income was adjusted for household size and composition, a rather 
different picture emerged. The correlation between carbon dioxide emissions and 
equivalised income is 0.131, so 13.1% of the variance in carbon dioxide emission is 
explained by variation in household income. Median carbon dioxide emissions in the 
first decile were 4123 kg and stay around there, although bobbing down to 3967 kg in 
the fourth decile, then rising sharply to 4777 kg in the eighth decile, 5078 kg in the 
ninth decile and 5582kg in the tenth decile. In both Tables 2.4 and 2.5 the emissions 
of the 80
th percentile in the lowest decile are substantially higher than those at the 20
th 
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Table 2.5  Household carbon emissions by income decile in 1996 (equivalent 
incomes) 
   Carbon  dioxide  emissions  (kg) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 1705  4123  6524 
2 1780  4135  6262 
3 1770  4256  6486 
4 1915  3967  6558 
5 2015  4100  6197 
6 2149  4306  6702 
7 1981  4361  6762 
8 2586  4777  7522 
9 2494  5078  8092 
10 2702  5582  9287 
 
Source: EHCS 1996 
 
These results reveal that any attempt at a domestic carbon or energy tax in the UK 
would have to rely heavily on redistribution of the revenues through benefits increases 
and tax credits in order to avoid increasing fuel poverty. 
 
2.3  Comparing household fuel bills and income (ehcs) 
 
2.3.1 Non-equivalent  incomes 
 
The distribution of gas and electricity charges in the 1996 EHCS has been examined 
in order that they can be compared with the distribution recorded in the 1999-2000 
FES. 
 
The correlation in the EHCS between fuel bills and household income is 0.187, so 
18.7% of the variance in fuel bills is explained by variation in household income. 
Median household energy bills were £563 in 1996. They rose from £424 for 
households in the first decile to £687 in the ninth decile and sharply to £793 in the  
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tenth decile. About 25% of energy bills for households in the first decile were above 
the median for the entire distribution, while nearly 40% of bills in the ninth decile and 
over 30% of bills in the tenth decile were below the median. By comparing Table 2.6 
with Table 2.2, it can be seen that wealthier households were paying less per unit for 
their energy (the median price for those in the tenth decile was 2.67p/kWh, compared 
to 3.66p/kWh, 37% more, for those in the first decile). 
 
Table  2.6  Household fuel bills by income decile in 1996 (non-equivalent 
incomes) 
     Annual  domestic  fuel  bills  (£) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 219.35  423.55  629.92 
2 237.77  421.68  603.81 
3 301.75  467.87  688.02 
4 307.69  527.37  717.85 
5 392.80  580.48  815.56 
6 349.78  571.93  805.28 
7 359.28  591.43  814.03 
8 410.27  637.19  872.10 
9 435.28  687.06  896.46 
10 505.32  793.23  1125.93 
 
Source: EHCS 1996 
 
2.3.2 Equivalent  incomes 
 
The effect is even clearer when incomes are adjusted for household size and 
composition. The correlation between fuel bills and equivalised income is 0.078, so 
7.8% of the variance in fuel bills is accounted for by variation in equivalised income. 
Median energy bills in the first decile were £556, falling to £516 by the fourth decile, 
then rising very slightly, but sharply in the eighth decile to overtake the whole-sample 
median (£563) at £592 and reaching £654 in the tenth decile. Nearly half the bills in 
the first decile were above the median for the whole distribution.  
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Table 2.7  Household fuel bills by income decile in 1996 (equivalent incomes) 
     Annual  domestic  fuel  bills  (£) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 309.34  555.69  785.50 
2 328.75  548.29  784.39 
3 323.55  534.42  796.80 
4 323.78  516.33  773.08 
5 298.75  535.61  767.06 
6 327.28  531.75  784.24 
7 329.24  532.15  758.55 
8 383.43  591.63  852.74 
9 365.66  633.02  890.32 
10 399.13  654.20  972.74 
 
Source: EHCS 1996 
 
2.4  Comparing household fuel bills and income (fes) 
 
The 1999-2000 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) was analysed for its distributional 
pattern of household energy bills in order to see whether it was similar to that 
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Table 2.8:  Income deciles in the family expenditure survey 1999-2000 
 
Decile Income  £  Equivalent income
2 £ 
1  0 - 4924.30  0- 6558.94 
2  4924.30- 7262.16  6558.94 - 8849.08 
3  7262.16 - 9718.86  8849.08 - 11065.22 
4  9718.86- 12500.88  11065.22 - 13470.73 
5  12500.88 - 15638.74  13470.73 - 15878.52 
6  15638.74 - 19303.98  15878.52 - 18507.63 
7  19303.98 - 23252.94  18507.63 - 21754.49 
8  23252.94 - 28726.05  21754.49 - 26360.18 
9  28726.05 – 36994.38  26360.18 - 34293.30 
10  36994.38 -   34293.30 -  
 
Source: FES 1999-2000 
 
2.4.1 Non-equivalent  incomes 
 
The correlation between fuel bills and household income is 0.207, so 20.7% of the 
variance in fuel bills is explained by household income. Median household energy 
bills in the 1999-2000 Family Expenditure Survey were £540 (rather below the EHCS 
figure of £563 for 1996, before energy market liberalisation). They rose from £361 in 
the first decile to £768 in the tenth decile. Nearly 30% of energy bills for households 
in the first decile were above the median for the entire distribution, while about 35% 
of bills in the ninth decile and a little over 20% of bills in the tenth decile were below 
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Table 2.9  Household fuel bills by income decile in 1999-2000 (non-equivalent 
incomes) 
 
     Annual  domestic  fuel  bills  (£) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 162.24  361.40  650.00 
2 241.28  468.00  759.10 
3 267.38  456.30  749.53 
4 281.42  503.88  759.72 
5 315.64  528.32  814.32 
6 327.08  534.04  796.12 
7 363.48  573.82  845.62 
8 439.09  628.94  879.84 
9 431.60  639.60  912.08 
10 520.00  768.04  1104.48 
 
Source: FES 1999/2000 
 
2.4.2 Equivalent  incomes 
 
When incomes are adjusted for household size and composition, median fuel bills are 
£520 in the first decile, falling to £460 in the second decile, then rise in the third 
decile to return to £520 in the fourth decile, then bob around between £530 and £563 
in the fifth to eighth deciles, before rising to £588 in the ninth and £614 in the tenth 
deciles. The pattern observed here is slightly different from that in the 1996 EHCS, 
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Table  2.10  Household fuel bills by income decile in 1999-2000 (equivalent 
incomes) 
 
     Annual  domestic  fuel  bills  (£) 
Decile 20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
1 208.00  520.00  832.00 
2 241.49  460.20  774.80 
3 269.78  501.80  788.11 
4 321.57  520.00  803.09 
5 300.04  530.40  780.00 
6 336.54  563.94  848.02 
7 359.84  557.96  804.86 
8 366.50  612.04  873.29 
9 377.62  588.12  879.84 
10 359.84  614.12  999.44 
 
Source: FES 1999-2000 
 
While the next section carries out some detailed calculations, it can be seen at once 
from the above distributions that a carbon tax has the potential to be very regressive 
indeed for high energy users in the lower deciles. The regressivity would hardly be 
addressed at all if the revenues were redistributed by reductions in, for example, 
labour taxes, because these are not paid by many on low incomes. An equal tax-free 
energy allowance to all households (sometimes called an ecobonus) could remove this 
regressivity on average, but the tax would still severely impact a large number of low-
income households, because the increase in energy consumption or carbon dioxide 
emissions as household income increases is much less than the variation between 
households at the same income level. One way to attempt to address the problem 
would be through benefits increases, and tax credits for those in work on low 
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3. Removing the adverse social effects of a household carbon        
tax 
 
3.1  The direct effects of a household carbon tax 
 
It was decided to model the effects of a carbon tax set at the standard rate of the 
existing Climate Change Levy on the non-domestic sector, which is 0.43p/kWh for 
electricity and 0.19p/kWh for gas. This is broadly equivalent to a carbon tax of £10 
per tonne of carbon dioxide (£37 per tonne carbon).  
 
Previous models of the effect of a carbon tax on the domestic sector have simply 
made the putative tax proportional to household bills (e.g. Johnson, McKay and Smith 
1990), a simplifying assumption that distorts the results because standing charges 
account for a significant proportion of domestic energy bills and because many poor 
households are on prepayment meters, which are significantly more expensive than 
paying quarterly bills, while wealthier customers are more likely to pay by direct 
debit, which is instead slightly cheaper than paying quarterly bills. All these factors 
mean that making the assumed carbon dioxide output proportional to bills will tend to 
overstate the regressivity of a carbon tax. For this research, expected carbon dioxide 
output from domestic energy use was instead calculated for households in the FES. 
The reason for doing this when the data on energy expenditure in FES is less reliable 
than that in EHCS was so as to be able to link the calculations to POLIMOD, a model 
of the tax-benefits system devised by Holly Sutherland of Cambridge University, in 
order to calculate to what extent benefit changes could be used to compensate for 
adverse social effects of a carbon tax. 
 
In order to take advantage of POLIMOD, it was first necessary to back-calculate the 
carbon dioxide emissions. Since 80% of households are still with their regional 
electricity company and 80% of households with gas are still with British Gas, those 
tariffs were used as a simplifying assumption given that there was no data about 
which utility each household was with. There was also no data about expenditure on 
off-peak electricity, but since discriminant analysis of EHCS data showed that the 
overwhelming determinant of an all-electric household being on an off-peak tariff was  
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the size of bill, a proportion of all-electric households was sampled to reflect the 
pattern found in EHCS. The median proportion of off-peak electricity use among 
households on an off-peak electricity tariff is 62%, so that figure was used in the 
back-calculation. 
 
The revenue collected from the carbon tax is £1.287 billion per year. This is just under 
£1 a week per household. The distributional effects of the carbon tax before any 
compensation measures are shown in Tables 3.1 a, b and c. The results below define 
losers as households losing £0.10 or more per week; and gainers as those gaining 
£0.10 or more. Households with very small carbon emissions (less than 0.52 tonnes of 
carbon dioxide, and therefore paying £5.20 per year or less) are not classified as 
losers.  
 
Distributional results are shown in three ways: (a) according to the decile group of the 
household, defined using household disposable income equivalised by the 
McClements equivalence scale (which is used in POLIMOD); (b) according to 
whether the household contains children (child benefit definition); (c) according to 
whether the household contains pensioners (i.e. women over 60 or men over 65). 
Households with pensioners and children are considered by the Government to be two 
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Table 3.1a All households 




% losers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1 10  -36.92  0.51  81.7  2.7 
2 10  -43.73  0.40  84.8  3.4 
3 10  -40.25  0.31  86.6  2.9 
4 10  -42.59  0.29  87.5  3.6 
5 10  -48.20  0.27  91.7  5.5 
6 10  -48.52  0.23  88.0  4.1 
7 10  -53.46  0.22  90.9  5.8 
8 10  -57.46  0.20  92.5  10.2 
9 10  -58.03  0.17  92.8  8.1 
10 10 -66.56  0.12  97.0  14.7 
All 100  -49.56  0.22  89.4  6.1 
N 
(million) 
24.944      
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Table 3.1b Households with children 




% losers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1 8.81  -40.46  0.35  77.2  4.9 
2 12.5  -49.40  0.34  79.6  4.9 
3 10.94  -45.19  0.26  84.4  4.2 
4 9.82  -48.05  0.24  85.5  5.6 
5 11.59  -56.99  0.24  93.5  6.4 
6 11.5  -55.69  0.20  88.3  5.8 
7 10.37  -63.18  0.20  92.9  8.3 
8 8.44  -70.36  0.19  94.3  17.3 
9 8.97  -68.54  0.15  94.5  8.9 
10 7.06  -88.35  0.11  97.9  29.1 
All 100  -57.30  0.20  88.4  8.6 
N 
(million) 
7.256      
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Table 3.1c: Households with pensioners 




% losers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1 9.85  -44.77  0.65  95.6  3.4 
2 14.26  -42.59  0.47  91.7  2.5 
3 15.71  -39.47  0.37  90.3  2.7 
4 15.95  -41.13  0.33  88.9  2.8 
5 11.84  -45.76  0.30  91.4  7.2 
6 10.36  -47.84  0.27  92.3  4.0 
7 7.28  -55.38  0.28  93.3  7.2 
8 6.87  -56.21  0.24  92.8  10.9 
9 4.36  -70.56  0.21  88.1  21.7 
10 3.42  -75.61  0.15  96.7  22.0 
All 100  -47.22  0.30  91.7  5.8 
N 
(million) 
7.654      
n  2086      
 
As expected, all three tables clearly show the regressivity of an uncompensated 
carbon tax. On average, households in the first decile pay 0.51% of their income in 
tax, compared with 0.22% for those in the tenth decile; for households with children 
the figures are 0.35% compared with 0.2%; for pensioner households they are 0.65% 
compared with 0.3%. The disparities are even greater if the low-income households 
using most energy (those most likely to be in fuel poverty) are considered. This is 
presumably the kind of outcome that has caused the Government to rule out 
household energy or carbon taxes, as noted above. 
 
3.2 Compensating  measures 
 
The effectiveness of using the tax-benefits system to compensate low-income 
households for a carbon tax was modelled
3. The basic idea for the compensation 
measures modelled here was to concentrate on means-tested benefits as a way of  
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targeting those most likely to be in need of assistance. There are income-replacement 
benefits such as Income Support (IS), Jobseeker’s Allowance (the means-tested form 
of Jobseeker’s Allowance is essentially the same as Income Support), and the rather 
more generous Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) for pensioners. These benefits are 
all means-tested at the level of the individual or couple. There are also two benefits 
that are means-tested at the level of the household: Housing Benefit (HB), which 
helps with rent and with interest payments on mortgages taken out before 1996, and 
Council Tax Benefit (CTB), which helps with Council Tax. Finally, there are the 
means-tested tax credits that were introduced recently: Working Tax Credit (WTC), 
which boosts incomes for those working over 16 hours a week and Child Tax Credit 
(CTC), which provides an allowance for the cost of bringing up children and is the 
centrepiece of the government’s plan to eliminate child poverty. These benefits are all 
withdrawn at different rates as additional income rises. They interact in complicated 
ways depending on individual circumstances. Experiments with different 
combinations of these benefits were used to explore how the benefits system could be 
used to provide compensation and how effective it would be. 
 
3.2.1  Compensating low-income households with pensioners 
 
For pensioners two possible ways of compensating households for the carbon tax are 
modelled. The first (called CTPens1) adds 90 pence per week to the pensioners’ 
winter heating allowance. This reaches all households with pensioners (and also those 
with someone aged 60+ on MIG). Table 3.2a shows the distributional effect. (The 90p 
amount is chosen as the average weekly loss among pensioners due to the CO2 tax.) It 
can be seen that in the lower deciles, more pensioners gain than lose from the tax plus 
compensation, but in the higher deciles it is the other way round. However, even in 
the lowest decile, about a third of pensioners (32.1%) lose. Those in the lowest decile 
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Table 3.2a Pensioner households with winter heating 
allowance increased by 90p a week (CTPens1) 
Deciles average  net 
change £/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1  1.77  32.1 50.9 1.2 
2  4.21  35.2 50.0 0.3 
3  7.33  27.3 57.4 0.9 
4  5.67  34.3 52.5 0.4 
5  1.04  37.3 50.9 1.4 
6  -1.04  41.7 44.6 0.9 
7  -8.58  47.0 38.8 1.3 
8  -10.04  50.1 40.1 1.9 
9  -23.76  62.5 34.7 4.3 
10  -28.81  58.5 35.9 8.4 
All -0.47  38.3 48.5 1.3 
 
 
The second means of compensation (CTPens2) increases MIG, HB and CTB by £1.90 
for a single person and £3.05 for a couple (for people aged over 60). Because of some 
degree of non-take-up of MIG this does not reach all poor pensioners. It also reaches 
no pensioners with income too high for MIG. Table 3.2b shows the distributional 
effect. The level of the increase is designed to redistribute the same amount of tax 
revenue as the heating allowance increase in CTPens1, but in this case richer 
pensioner households are effectively compensating poorer pensioner households for 
the tax. This measure has a rather different distributional effect to the previous one. 
The average net change is much more progressive (i.e. low-income households gain 
more), but the number of losers is consistently higher through the deciles (and is 
nearly half, 47.5%, in the lowest decile). The percentage of poor pensioners losing 
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Table 3.2b Pensioner households with increase of MIG of 
£1.90/3.05 a week (CTPens2) 
Deciles average  net 
change £/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1  39.21  47.5 47.3 2.1 
2  19.29  42.5 49.0 1.4 
3  11.75  49.1 42.1 1.4 
4  10.09  48.5 46.4 1.6 
5  -13.16  67.3 28.7 3.5 
6  -20.96  69.8 26.3 2.4 
7  -24.54  68.2 29.3 6.7 
8  -44.88  84.2 15.8 9.8 
9  -68.28  85.9 14.2 20.0 
10 -65.52  91.4  8.6  19.0 
All -3.74  59.0 35.0 4.2 
 
3.2.2  Compensating households with children 
 
For households with children two compensation methods have also been investigated, 
both of which amount to richer households with children compensating poorer 
households for the tax. The first (CTChild1) increases the family amount in the CTC, 
and also gives corresponding increases through HB and CTB. This increase will be 
received by most families with children up to the upper ceiling (when parents move 
onto higher rate income tax). The increase is set so the cost is the same in value as the 
CO2 tax collected from these households: £1 per week per family. Table 3.3a shows 
the distributional effects. 28.5% of households with children in the lowest decile are 
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Table 3.3a Households with children, with increase in 
family element in CTC of £1a week (CTChild1) 
Deciles average  net 
change £/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1  12.58  28.5 63.7 1.0 
2  3.33  31.1 60.5 1.4 
3  6.86  34.8 54.9 1.2 
4  3.95  38.8 50.7 1.4 
5  -4.32  49.9 38.3 0.0 
6  -3.12  47.6 39.9 0.7 
7  -11.80  50.3 31.9 1.9 
8  -23.92  67.5 25.1 6.1 
9  -38.12  74.4 20.3 6.8 
10 -81.38  95.1  1.5  26.9 
All -10.61  49.6 40.5 3.8 
 
The second method of compensation (CTChild2) targets a larger increase on those 
with low incomes. The increase is on the amount per child in IS/HB/CTB (and would 
be channelled through the CTC payment). There is some degree of non-take-up 
assumed. £1.30 is added per child – an amount that costs the same as the first option. 
Results are shown in Table 3.3b. There is little change in the percentage of losers in 
the lowest decile, but now markedly fewer in the second and third deciles. However, 
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Table 3.3b Households with children With increase in 
amount per child in CTC (and HB/CTB) of £1.30a week 
(CTChild2) 
Deciles average  net 
change £/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1  53.40  29.7 64.8 2.8 
2  65.26  16.3 80.1 1.2 
3  57.88  24.7 70.3 9.3 
4  19.81  47.0 47.2 3.3 
5  -27.09  72.4 22.5 5.0 
6 -43.52  80.7  8.8  4.7 
7 -59.28  90.5  2.8  7.9 
8 -66.30  91.0  3.6  15.8 
9 -66.30  94.1  1.3  8.5 
10 -87.67  97.4  0.5  29.1 
All -10.87  62.0 32.5 6.8 
 
3.2.3  Compensating all households on benefits (with partial take-up) 
 
A compensation method (CTAllPT) was investigated which covers the whole 
population (though with some degree of non-take-up) and is channelled through 
means-tested benefits/credits as follows: 
 
IS/MIG £2 per single person, £3.20 per couple (also in HB and CTB) 
CTC £1 per child 
WTC £2 per claim 
 
This costs about the same as the total amount collected by the carbon tax. The 
distributional effects are shown in Table 3.4. The measure is progressive, and on 
average those in the lowest decile are over £1 per week better off, but there are still a 
large number of losers in the lowest deciles (over a third, 35.1%, in the lowest decile). 
1.3% of households in both of the bottom two deciles lose more than £2 pw.  
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Table 3.4 All households: Increase in MTBs (CTAllPT)  
Deciles average  net 
change £/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1  69.32  35.1 57.1 1.3 
2  76.23  28.7 66.3 1.3 
3  55.02  37.3 56.8 1.0 
4  29.64  45.4 49.4 1.9 
5  -5.88  66.8 28.7 3.0 
6  -23.66  72.3 19.7 2.8 
7  -40.77  81.9 10.8 5.3 
8 -47.89  87.1  7.4  9.2 
9 -55.69  91.6  1.8  7.4 
10 -62.97  94.8  5.2  13.8 
All -0.68  64.1 30.0 4.7 
 
 
3.2.4  Compensating all households on benefits (with full take-up) 
 
What is the distributional effect of the carbon tax if full take up of benefits is 
assumed, perhaps as a result of heightened awareness of tax/benefit issues at the time 
of the tax’s introduction? The effect of the tax itself (shown in Table 3.5) is slightly 
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Table 3.5: Carbon tax effect on all households, with 100% 
take-up of benefits 




% losers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1 10  -38.22  0.48  82.9  3.2 
2 10  -40.35  0.35  86.1  3.0 
3 10  -43.52  0.33  86.0  3.1 
4 10  -42.59  0.28  87.7  3.9 
5 10  -48.00  0.26  90.7  5.3 
6 10  -48.57  0.23  89.0  4.2 
7 10  -53.40  0.22  90.5  5.9 
8 10  -57.10  0.20  92.4  10.0 
9 10  -58.03  0.17  92.8  8.1 
10 10 -66.56  0.12  97.0  14.8 
All 100  -49.66  0.21  89.5  6.1 
N 
(million) 
24.944      
n  6613      
 
If there was full take-up of benefits, then the following package could be funded with 
the revenues: 
 
IS/MIG £1.65 per single person, £2.65 per couple (also in HB and CTB) 
CTC £0.85 per child, WTC £1.65 per claim 
 
With full take-up of benefits, the measure would be even more progressive on 
average, with households in the lowest decile gaining nearly £73 per year (Table 3.6). 
In addition, the number of losers falls sharply, but it still remains at about 20% in the 
lowest decile. There are also fewer households that lose more than £2 pw in the lower 
deciles, although even in the lowest decile 0.7% still do. Moreover, the losers among 
the poorest deciles will mostly be those who are already in the worst fuel poverty, 
although many of the less severely fuel poor would gain.  
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Table 3.6 All households 100% take-up, increase in means-tested 
benefits (CTAllFT, see text) 
Deciles average net change
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1 72.85  19.6  75.9 0.7 
2 72.33  23.2  72.7 0.4 
3 53.30  28.0  67.4 1.4 
4 28.60  39.4  55.6 1.8 
5 -6.19  62.2  32.3 2.7 
6 -23.50  70.5  21.8 2.6 
7 -39.73  79.6  12.6 5.3 
8 -48.57  86.6  7.7  9.3 
9 -55.28  91.2  1.6  6.9 
10 -62.76  94.6  5.4  13.8 
All -0.83  59.5 35.0  4.5 
 
3.2.5  Modifying the carbon tax 
 
A way to try to help poorer households would be to follow the German example and 
only charge households with pre-existing off-peak electric heating half the normal rate 
of the carbon tax, so that they are effectively only paying slightly more per kilowatt-
hour than a household heated with gas. Table 3.7 shows the distributional effect of the 
modified carbon tax, assuming partial benefit take-up. The revenue gain is £1.21 
billion. The impact of the concession on regressivity is modest. The proportion of 
income paid in tax for the lowest and highest deciles is 0.49% and 0.21%, compared 
to 0.51% and 0.22% in Table 3.1a. The percentage of households in the poorest decile 
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Table 3.7: All households, modified carbon tax, partial 
take-up 




% losers  %  losing 
> £2 pw 
1 10  -35.93  0.49  81.7  2.7 
2 10  -42.54  0.39  84.8  3.4 
3 10  -38.90  0.30  86.2  2.8 
4 10  -41.39  0.28  87.3  3.2 
5 10  -46.70  0.26  91.7  5.3 
6 10  -47.06  0.22  88.0  3.8 
7 10  -51.95  0.21  90.9  5.7 
8 10  -56.26  0.20  92.5  9.8 
9 10  -57.04  0.17  92.8  7.9 
10 10 -65.57  0.12  97.0  14.1 
All 100  -48.36  0.21  89.3  5.9 
N 
(million) 
24.944      
n  6613      
 
Table 3.8 shows the effect of compensating as follows:  
 
IS/MIG £2 per single person, £3.20 per couple (also in HB and CTB) 
CTC £1 per child 
WTC £2 per claim 
 
The difference in the impact compared to the compensation package for the original 
carbon tax (see Table 3.4) is slight. Over a third of households in the lowest decile 
still lose out from the tax plus compensation package. The percentage of households 
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Table 3.8 All households, modified carbon tax, partial take-
up, increase in means-tested benefits (MCTAllPT, see text) 
Deciles average  net 
change £/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2 pw 
1  68.54  34.9 57.2 1.3 
2  75.87  28.5 66.3 1.3 
3  55.12  36.6 56.6 1.0 
4  30.16  45.0 49.6 1.6 
5  -4.63  66.8 28.9 2.7 
6  -22.26  72.3 19.7 2.2 
7  -39.31  81.9 10.8 5.1 
8 -46.70  87.1  7.4  9.0 
9 -54.76  91.6  1.8  7.2 
10 -61.98  94.8  2.1  13.2 
All 0.00  63.9 30.0 4.4 
 
The impact of the modified carbon tax with 100% take up of benefits, but before any 
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Table 3.9: All households, modified carbon tax, 100% 
take-up 






% losing > 
£2pw 
1 10  -37.08  1.35  82.9  3.2 
2 10  -39.31  0.38  85.9  3.0 
3 10  -42.22  0.34  86.0  3.0 
4 10  -41.34  0.30  87.3  3.5 
5 10  -46.49  0.27  90.7  5.0 
6 10  -47.11  0.23  89.0  3.6 
7 10  -51.95  0.22  90.5  5.8 
8 10  -55.90  0.21  92.4  9.7 
9 10  -57.10  0.18  92.8  8.0 
10 10 -65.57  0.13  97.0  14.0 
All 100  -48.41  0.36  89.5  5.9 
Number of households (N, million) 
 
24.944  




A scheme for redistributing the revenues from the modified carbon tax under the 
100% take-up assumption (MCTAllFT) looks like this: 
 
IS/MIG £1.65 per single person, £2.65 per couple (also in HB and CTB) 
CTC £0.85 per child 
WTC £1.65 per claim 
 
This measure reduces the number of losers among the poorest deciles still further and 
increases progressivity (see Table 3.10). Less than 1% of households in the lowest 
two deciles now lose more than £2 per week from the tax plus compensation package. 
But around a fifth in each decile are still made worse off. 
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Table 3.10: All households, modified carbon tax, 100% take-up, increase 
in means-tested benefits (MCTAllFT, see text) 
Deciles average net change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2pw 
1 73.94  19.0  76.3  0.7 
2 74.83  23.0  73.1  0.4 
3 54.55  27.1  68.0  1.4 
4 30.32  39.1  55.8  1.4 
5 -4.73  62.2  32.3  2.5 
6 -22.05  70.5  22.1  2.3 
7 -38.22  79.5  12.9  5.1 
8 -47.32  86.6  7.7  9.1 
9 -54.34  91.2  1.5  6.7 
10 -61.78  94.5  5.5  13.1 
All 0.0  59.3  35.2  4.3 
 
Table 3.11 shows the impact on pensioners of the measure (MCTPensFT). The overall 
distribution is not much different from that for all households in Table 3.10, except 
that 1.0% of pensioners lose more than £2 per week, and there are more losers in the 
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Table 3.11: Households with pensioners , modified carbon tax, 100% take-
up, increase means-tested benefits (MCTPensFT, see text) 
Deciles average net change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2pw 
1 42.38  19.1  78.8  1.0 
2 31.15  34.4  59.4  0.3 
3 27.04  36.9  55.9  1.4 
4 19.86  38.5  55.6  1.4 
5 -3.43  58.3  37.1  2.4 
6 -10.92  60.8  35.9  2.3 
7 -20.49  62.1  34.1  6.5 
8 -40.35  81.5  14.1  9.7 
9 -59.12  83.3  5.4  16.0 
10 -64.90  91.4  7.4  19.0 
All 5.18  49.0  45.8  3.6 
 
3.2.6  Redistributing some of the winter fuel allowance 
 
It was thought that redistributing some of the money from the Winter Fuel Allowance 
might help the situation by redirecting it through means-tested benefits onto those 
most in need.  
 
The package modelled (MCTWFA1AllFT) was: 
 




IS/MIG £2.65 per single person, £4.35 per couple (also in HB and CTB) 
CTC £1.40 per child 
WTC £2.65 per claim 
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Table 3.12 shows that this turned out actually to increase both the number of losers 
(from 19% to 26%), and the numbers losing relatively large amounts (4.9% as 
opposed to 0.7% now lose more than £2 per week), even in low income groups and in 
spite of assuming 100% take-up of means-tested benefits (see Table 3.10 for 
comparison). 
 
Table 3.12: All households, modified carbon tax, 100% 
take-up, reduce Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 pa and 
increase means-tested benefits (MCTWFA1AllFT, see 
text) 
Deciles average  net 
change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2pw 
1  117.42  26.2 67.9 4.9 
2  103.12  33.0 64.2 10.7 
3  68.54 38.1 58.1 16.5 
4  25.58 47.8 47.1 18.0 
5  -13.62 66.9 28.6 21.3 
6  -39.31 75.2 17.1 20.2 
7  -52.78 82.1 10.6 17.6 
8 -63.28  87.1  7.8  24.1 
9 -66.20  92.8  1.7  15.6 
10 -69.94  93.7  3.6  20.4 
All 0.0  64.3 31.7 16.9 
 
Table 3.13 shows the same information as Table 3.12, but for households with 
pensioners (MCTWFA1PensFT). The proportion losing relatively large amounts, 
even at low income levels, is large for pensioners, rising in the lowest decile from 
1.0% to over 15% (see Table 3.11 for comparison). The average net change is 
negative for all deciles except Decile 1, showing that for these households the loss in 
WFA plus the carbon tax payments are larger than the increased benefits.  
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Table 3.13: Households with pensioners, modified carbon 
tax, 100% take-up, reduce Winter Fuel Allowance by 
£100 pa and increase means-tested benefits 
(MCTWFA1PensFT, see text) 
Deciles average  net 
change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2pw 
1  13.73 45.6 44.7 15.1 
2  -22.05 61.2 35.8 24.8 
3  -31.04 59.1 35.4 31.7 
4  -43.63 58.9 34.9 36.1 
5  -78.31 74.2 21.9 55.0 
6  -89.39 78.1 17.6 58.2 
7  -100.88  77.7 19.6 61.1 
8  -130.88  87.2 10.2 80.4 
9 -153.35  97.8  2.2  82.0 
10 -159.69  94.3  5.8  88.4 
All -61.15 68.1 27.4 45.1 
 
Table 3.14 shows the effect of concentrating the resources released by cutting the 
Winter Fuel Allowance and increasing Pension Credit, rather than increasing means-
tested benefits for all households (MCTWFA2AllFT). This substantially reduces the 
proportion of losers in the lowest two deciles (from 26.2% to 18.5% in the lowest 
decile, see Table 3.12 for comparison), and the proportion losing more than £2 per 
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Table 3.14: All households, modified carbon tax 100% take-up, reduce 
Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 pa and increase means-tested benefits 
targeted on Pension Credit (MCTWFA2AllFT, see text) 
Deciles average net change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2pw 
1 99.68  18.5  77.1  3.8 
2 88.66  25.2  71.9  7.8 
3 64.79  30.9  67.4  10.7 
4 37.28  42.3  54.9  15.6 
5 -14.92  63.2  32.3  20.5 
6 -33.54  71.0  22.4  20.5 
7 -47.68  80.1  13.2  17.6 
8 -63.44  87.8  7.4  24.0 
9 -66.14  92.5  1.8  15.9 
10 -70.41  94.3  2.8  20.3 
All 0.0  60.6  35.1  15.7 
 
Table 3.15 shows the effect of a similar package (MCTWFA2PensFT) on pensioners. 
Again the proportions of losers in the lowest two deciles are reduced (from 45.6% to 
18.9% in the lowest decile, see Table 3.13 for comparison), but 41% of households in 
the second decile remain worse off. The proportions in these deciles losing more than 
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Table 3.15: Households with pensioners, modified carbon tax, 100% take-
up, reduce Winter Fuel Allowance by £100 pa and increase means-tested 
benefits targeted on Pension Credit (MCTWFA2PensFT see text) 
Deciles average net change 
£/year 
% losers  % gainers  %  losing  > 
£2pw 
1 118.14  18.9  78.7  11.6 
2 54.55  41.0  55.1  17.9 
3 43.32  45.2  53.9  20.1 
4 26.26  45.9  53.1  31.1 
5 -34.89  61.3  37.2  52.8 
6 -46.33  62.5  37.0  58.2 
7 -61.62  64.6  35.5  61.3 
8 -117.05  86.9  12.7  79.4 
9 -146.74  92.9  7.1  84.1 
10 -147.26  89.6  86.9  10.4 
All -3.12  53.9  44.8  40.9 
 
3.2.7  Summary of results of compensation measures 
 
Table 3.16 summarises the results of the various compensation methods for the 
bottom three deciles, households with equivalent incomes of less than about £11,000 
per year. 
 
The first point to be made is that for the lowest decile all the tax plus compensation 
packages are progressive on average (that is, the average household is a net gainer). 
The amounts gained range from £1.77 per year (CTPens1) to £118.14 per year 
(MCTWFA2PensFT). The same is true for Deciles 2 and 3, except in respect of 
MCTWFA1PensFT when, not surprisingly, nearly all pensioner households lose out 
from the redistribution of some of their WFA to non-pensioner low-income 
households. Essentially these results substantiate the hypothesis on which this 
research was based, namely that it is possible to make a carbon tax such as that 
imposed progressive for the average household in the lowest deciles. 
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Decile 1  Decile 2  Decile 3 






























CTPens1 (3.2a)  1.77 32.1  50.9 1.2  4.21 35.2  50.0 0.3  7.33 27.3  57.4 0.9 
CTPens2 (3.2b)  39.21 47.5  47.3  2.1  19.29 42.5  49.0  1.4  11.75 49.1  42.1  1.4 
CTChild1 (3.3a)  12.58  28.5  63.7 1.0  3.33 31.1  60.5 1.4  6.86 34.8  54.9 1.2 
CTChild2 (3.3b)  53.40 29.7  64.8  2.8  65.26 16.3  80.1  1.2  57.88 24.7  70.3  9.3 
CTAllPT (3.4)  69.32 35.1  57.1  1.3  76.23 28.7  66.3  1.3  55.02 37.3  56.8  1.0 
CTAllFT (3.6)  72.85 19.6  75.9  0.7  72.33 23.2  72.7  0.4  53.30 28.0  67.4  1.4 
MCTAllPT (3.8)  68.54 34.9  57.2  1.3  75.87 28.5  66.3  1.3  55.12 36.6  56.6  1.0 
MCTAllFT (3.10)  73.94 19.0  76.3  0.7  74.83 23.0  73.1  0.4  54.55 27.1  68.0  1.4 
MCTPensFT (3.11)  42.38 19.1  78.8  1.0  31.15 34.4  59.4  0.3  27.04 36.9  55.9  1.4 
MCTWFA1AllFT 
(3.12) 
117.42  26.2 67.9  4.9  103.12  33.0 64.2  10.7 68.54  38.1 58.1  16.5 
MCTWFA1PensFT  13.73  45.6 44.7  15.1 -22.05 61.2 35.8  24.8 -31.04 59.1 35.4  31.7  




99.68 18.5  77.1  3.8  88.66 25.2  71.9  7.8  64.79 30.9  67.4  10.7 
MCTWFA2PensFT 
(3.15) 
118.14  18.9 78.7  11.6 54.55  41.0 55.1  17.9 43.32  45.2 53.9  20.1 
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However, the enormously skewed distribution of energy consumption within the 
income deciles, which was showed in Section 2, means that the average result 
conceals great differences in net gains and losses within each decile. In fact, it can be 
seen from Table 3.16 that none of the compensation packages manage to reduce the 
proportion of Decile 1 households much below 20%, and the five that do get slightly 
below this figure (CTAllFT, MCTAllFT, MCTPensFT, MCTWFA2AllFT, 
MCTWFA4PensFT) all assume a 100% take up of the relevant means-tested benefits, 
which is clearly unlikely to be achieved. With the take up of benefits at current 
(partial) rates, none of the compensation methods reduces the proportion of all 
households in Decile 1 which lose out much below 35%. MCTAllPT gives the lowest 
result at 34.9% and 1.3% of Decile 1 households lose more than £2 per week. 
 
It is of course a political judgement whether such an outcome - broadly progressive, 
with reduced carbon emissions, bringing some households out of fuel poverty but with 
a significant negative impact on the fifth of households that are likely to be deepest in 
fuel poverty - would be socially acceptable. It would of course be campaigned against 
by the representatives of those among the fuel poor who are made worse off. Possibly 
they would be joined in their campaign by the better off who might also not welcome 
the substantial overall redistribution in favour of the poor that a package like 
MCTAllPT represents. 
 
In conclusion, the research has shown that although redistributing the revenues from a 
carbon tax through means-tested benefits would certainly be progressive overall and 
would bring some households out of fuel poverty, it does not seem to be possible to 
devise a means of doing it that would not also worsen fuel poverty for those who are 
already most badly affected by it. This makes it politically problematic at best, and 




An alternative to using the benefits system to compensate for a household carbon tax 
would be to identify vulnerable households that could be exempted from such a tax. A  
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household with an exemption could receive a certificate with a unique identification 
number that they could quote to gas and electricity suppliers administering the tax in 
order to receive an exemption from the tax on their bills. This measure would have the 
advantage that an exemption would avoid penalising those low-income households 
that are already most in fuel poverty. 
 
One way to attempt to do so might be to use benefits status to identify those in need of 
help. There are, however, a number of problems. Benefits status is not a reliable 
indicator of whether a household is in fuel poverty. The Energy Efficiency 
Commitment has found that about 30% of households in fuel poverty are not in 
receipt of benefits (Fuel Poverty Advisory Group 2003). Part of the reason is poor 
take up, but there are two other factors to consider: low wages and poor building 
fabric. There are holes in the safety net. For example, an adult without children with a 
part-time job may have an income above Jobseeker’s Allowance/Income Support 
levels, but still have a very low income and not be eligible for any benefits. A 
probably more important factor is that many people in fuel poverty live in energy 
inefficient homes. It would cost about £1,000 per annum to heat a poorly insulated 
home at SAP 30 to an adequate standard (DETR 2000), so such a household would 
need an income over £10,000 per annum to avoid fuel poverty. 
 
There are further practical problems. Most benefits, including means-tested benefits, 
are assessed at the level of the individual, not the household, so there can be wealthy 
households which have one member in receipt of benefits. The only benefits that are 
assessed at the level of the household are Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit. 
The complex rules that govern how much of each of these benefits a claimant receives 
mean that these two benefits run out at wildly varying incomes, typically between 
about £4,000 per annum and about £10,000 per annum, for reasons that have little to 
do with need and a great deal to do with the idiosyncracies of the way other benefits 
and tax credits are structured. 
 
It would be possible to create a separate benefit to pay the exemption, but since the 
carbon tax would typically be around £50 and generally below £100, the 
administrative overheads on claims would be relatively large and the take-up of such a 
small benefit would be likely to be very poor.  
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Another idea would be to use the tax system to determine which households were 
eligible for benefits. The problem is that individual taxation means that each person’s 
tax liability is assessed separately. Because 80% of taxpayers are only on PAYE, the 
Inland Revenue does not keep track of their address. Linking together the information 
on all the people at a particular address to determine whether it fell below the 
threshold for exemption would require an expensive overhaul of the way the Inland 
Revenue works. 
 
It is therefore difficult to see how an administratively feasible carbon tax exemption 
system could be set up within current institutional structures. This reinforces the 
earlier conclusion that it is not possible to introduce a carbon tax on household energy 
use in the UK without worsening the situation of some people already in fuel poverty, 
particularly those likely to be in the worst fuel poverty. This means that such a tax 
could not be introduced until the problem of fuel poverty itself has been resolved. 
Probably the only feasible way to do that is through improvements to the housing 
stock. 
 
4. A national home energy efficiency programme 
 
4.1  The Role of Government Funding 
 
The existence of large-scale opportunities for cost-effective household energy 
efficiency measures means that in principle the public policy problem could be 
regarded as one of securing investment rather than committing public expenditure. A 
National Home Energy Efficiency Programme, which sought over time to ensure that 
all cost-effective energy efficiency measures were in fact implemented throughout the 
UK housing stock could theoretically be financed by government, with the 
expenditure on the measures being subsequently recouped from households from their 
energy savings, while still leaving households better off. 
 
The practical difficulties of putting this approach into practice (including setting up 
the repayment schedules for the newly energy-efficient households) mean that such a  
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programme is unlikely to be implemented. A more promising approach would seem to 
be one in which households were incentivised to make their own cost-effective 
investments in improving their energy efficiency, all the financial benefits from which 
would then accrue to them. A scheme which takes this approach is proposed in the 
next section. Were such a scheme to be implemented, the result would be that at some 
point in the next decade, the great majority of the UK housing stock would be at a 
cost-effective level of energy efficiency. 
 
However, the measures described in the next section would not be sufficient to 
address the problem of low-income households that do not have the capital to make 
the necessary energy efficiency improvements to their homes. These groups need to 
continue to be addressed through programmes like Warm Front and the Energy 
Efficiency Commitment. However, it is apparent that the existing programmes are 
deficient in two ways. Firstly, their targeting needs to be improved. As noted above, 
of the order of half the households in fuel poverty are not eligible for Warm Front 
because they do not meet the narrow criteria of containing both vulnerable people and 
being in receipt of certain benefits. It is also worth noting that many of the households 
that do receive help are not actually in fuel poverty because they are already fairly 
well insulated (Fuel Poverty Advisory Group 2003). To resolve this problem the Fuel 
Poverty Advisory Group recommended that the eligibility requirements for the 
schemes should be changed to reflect fuel poverty rather than benefit status. 
 
The second deficiency in the existing programmes is that they do not provide enough 
money to address fully the underlying causes of fuel poverty, which are of three 
different kinds. One is the level of prices, which is why carbon taxation is so 
problematic for fuel poverty, as shown in the previous section. A second is living in a 
badly insulated home. A household requires an income of about £10,000 a year to 
escape fuel poverty in a SAP 30 home. The third cause of fuel poverty is having a 
very low income. In 1996 a household on Income Support needed an energy efficient 
SAP 70 home to escape fuel poverty (DETR 2000). Benefit levels have increased 
since then and fuel prices have fallen slightly in money terms, but the SAP required to 
escape fuel poverty on Income Support would not be a great deal lower today. SAP 70 
is the energy efficiency level typical of a home with an efficient boiler, loft insulation 
and cavity wall insulation (Pett 2002).  
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Houses that have cavity walls (almost all those built from the 1930s onwards) require 
only an efficient boiler (costing around £1000) and several hundred pounds’ worth of 
insulation to bring up to around SAP 70. The big problem is houses with solid walls, 
which account for one-third of the building stock, essentially almost all those built 
before the 1930s. These houses lose a great deal of heat through their walls, reducing 
the impact of other measures that can be taken. The walls can be clad on the outside, 
but this costs about £4000 and is not allowed in conservation areas. The walls can be 
insulated internally, but that is not as effective, slightly reduces the internal 
dimensions of the rooms and requires redecorating afterwards. It costs around £1500 
just for the insulation – redecorating costs extra, so it is usually done when complete 
redecoration is necessary anyway. Neither measure is quite cost-effective at present 
energy prices. The Fuel Poverty Advisory Group recommends that the most cost-
effective approach for these homes is to install an efficient gas condensing boiler, 
300mm of loft insulation and tank insulation. The energy bills for a semi-detached 
house achieving the recommended level of warmth would be about £500 per annum, 
so that a household would need an income of only £5,000 per annum to escape fuel 
poverty (Iles, 2002). 
 
As is recognised, homes beyond the reach of the gas supply are much more difficult to 
bring out of fuel poverty. These houses are mostly heated electrically at the moment, 
which is both expensive and carbon-intensive. The best approach currently available 
is to install efficient central heating with a condensing oil boiler. This is not as good 
as a gas boiler, but is much cheaper to run than electric heating – costs to achieve the 
same standard of warmth are reduced by nearly half (Iles 2002). However, it requires 
a very large oil tank and so is not practical for homes with no garden or only a small 
one (Iles, personal communication). The only way to get the energy bills of these 
homes down to an acceptable level would be with full insulation, including solid wall 
insulation for those homes with solid walls. It should also be noted that oil heating 
reduces bills compared to electric heating, but it does not reduce carbon emissions 
much. If the aim is to reduce carbon emissions, there would have to be a focus instead 
on solid wall insulation even though it is not currently cost effective. Implementing 
such measures through Warm Front would require that its current upper limit on 
grants (£2000 at present) would have to be increased.   
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There are 2.5 million UK households currently in fuel poverty according the 
definition that includes housing costs and 3.2 million households according to the 
definition that excludes housing costs (Fuel Poverty Advisory Group 2003). It is 
estimated that bringing all of them out of fuel poverty would cost an average of £2000 
each (ibid). That implies an upper figure for the elimination of fuel poverty of about 
£6.4 billion. That is about twice what the government plans to spend on the problem 
up to 2010. It therefore seems likely that resolving the fuel poverty problem by 2016, 
a commitment the Government made in the Energy White Paper (DTI 2003), will 
require about twice the financial resources that have so far been allocated to it, 
assuming perfect targeting. 
 
4.2  Mobilising private investment in energy efficiency 
 
The current focus of household energy efficiency measures on the poor makes sense 
in terms of social objectives but it has a very limited effect on carbon emissions 
because the rebound effect means that about half the efficiency gains are taken back 
in the form of increased comfort (Henderson et al. 2003). The fuel poor are only about 
10% of households. If carbon emissions from households overall are to be reduced, 
the focus will have to be on the 90% of households which are not fuel poor, and for 
which, at present, energy efficiency seems to be a low priority. The policies described 
in this section propose the use of economic instruments purely to encourage 
householders to improve the energy efficiency of their households. The policies are 
not intended to raise revenue, and it will be important politically that this intention is 
clearly apparent. An important design principle of these policies is therefore that no 
penalty attaches to households that do improve their energy efficiency within a 
prescribed timescale.  
 
4.2.1  Giving incentives through the council tax 
 
Council Tax is a tax levied on the occupiers of property to contribute towards the cost 
of providing local services. The properties are divided into a number of bands (A-H) 
related to their prices in 1991, when the tax was introduced Homes built after 1991  
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are placed in the same band as comparable properties in the area. The Council Tax is 
set annually. D-rated properties pay the standard charge. A-rated (lowest priced) 
properties pay two-thirds of the standard rate; H-rated (highest priced) properties pay 
twice the standard rate, with the other bands falling within this range. Table 4.1 shows 
the percentage of preperties in England in each Council Tax band, and Figure 4.1 
illustrates this. 
 
Table 4.1  Percentage of properties in England in each council tax band 
 
 












The policy proposed and investigated here is the levying of a surcharge of 20% on the 
Council Tax of all households that do not implement all cost-effective energy 
efficiency measures within a year of notification. The surcharge would rise by 10% 
(to a maximum of 100%) in each succeeding year that the measures were not carried 
out. 
 
Band A  Band B  Band C  Band D  Band E  Band F  Band G  Band H 
25.9  19.3  21.5  14.9  9.3 4.9 3.5 0.  6  
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Because not enough qualified installers of such measures exist to carry out this work 
all at once and it will take time to train sufficient installers to increase the current rate 
of energy efficiency improvements to the housing stock, it is proposed to implement 
the policy over ten years, starting with the highest Council Tax bands and working 
down the bands over the years. Because the proportion of households in each band 
varies significantly between regions and localities (see Figure 4.2), the bands which 
would be included for energy efficiency improvements in each year would need to 
vary from local authority to local authority. For instance, in most parts of London and 
the South East, the properties in bands G and H would be affected in the first year 
while at the other extreme, in most of the North East, properties in bands D to H 
would be involved in the first year. These bands account for about ten percent of 
households in the respective regions. Lower down the range, some bands account for 
much larger proportions of properties in each area. At the extreme, 60 percent of 
properties in the North East are in band A. Where more households existed in a band 
than could be improved in a particular year, some appropriate geographic division 
would need to be made in order to maximise the efficiency of the use of installers. 
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Cost-effective energy efficiency measures would be identified through already 
existing household energy audit procedures. Each year householders in the relevant 
band for that year would be notified that, if they wished to avoid a surcharge on their 
Council Tax in succeeding years, they would need to implement all cost-effective 
energy efficiency measures in their home. They would be advised how to obtain an 
energy audit of their home, which would deliver them a certificate listing all such 
measures. On completion of these measures by a qualified installer (chosen by the 
householder from a list of recommended installers), they would receive an 
implementation certificate, which they would send to their local Council Tax office to 
forestall or cancel the surcharge in the future. All households which implemented all 
cost-effective measures within a year of notification would therefore pay nothing on 
top of Council Tax. For most households, the financial savings following 
implementation of the measures would be substantial. 
 
Householders already living in energy-efficient homes would have a proportion of the 
cost of the energy audit deducted from their Council Tax in the subsequent year 
(provided any remaining cost-effective measures had been implemented), depending 
on the financial savings which these remaining measures were estimated to have 
delivered. Thus any household with no cost-effective measures available would have 
rebated the whole of the energy audit cost. 
 
A ring-fenced fund would be established, into which any Council Tax surcharges 
would be paid, to provide low-cost loans to carry out the measures for households on 
medium incomes. These loans would be recovered through the Council Tax 
mechanism in succeeding years, once the energy savings had started to materialise, at 
a rate calculated to reflect those savings. Depending on its resources, the fund would 
also pay grants to households eligible for the Warm Front scheme, or the measures 
could be carried out directly through the scheme.  
 
Regression analysis shows that the correlation between income and Council Tax band 
is 0.396, so 39.6% of the variance in income is reflected in Council Tax band. The 
correlation is strong, but not overwhelming. 
  
53   
The distribution of Council Tax band according to income decile among English 
households in the Family Expenditure Survey 2001 was as in Table 4.2 
 




Band B  Band C Band 
D 






34.4% 22.5% 21.1% 10.6% 6.4%  2.8%  2.3%  0% 
Decile 
2 
34.1% 23.5% 15.5% 15.9% 6.6%  2.7%  1.8%  0% 
Decile 
3 
28.6% 16.4% 24.8% 12.2% 10.1% 4.6%  2.1%  0.8% 
Decile 
4 
25.9% 24.4% 23.7% 13.5% 6.0%  2.3%  3.4%  0.4% 
Decile 
5 
29.3% 21.4% 19.9% 16.5% 5.3%  4.9%  1.5%  0.8% 
Decile 
6 
24.5% 26.0% 19.7% 14.4% 8.5%  3.8%  3.1%  0% 
Decile 
7 
21.4% 24.6% 17.8% 19.6% 8.3%  5.3%  2.1%  0.9% 
Decile 
8 
20.5% 21.4% 23.3% 17.1% 6.8%  5.3%  3.7%  0.6% 
Decile 
9 
18.4% 20.2% 17.2% 20.6% 11.7% 5.2%  5.2%  1.2% 
Decile 
10 
11.5% 14.1% 21.1% 23.7% 15.9% 8.9%  4.2%  0.5% 
 
The percentages recorded for the higher bands are clearly not very reliable because 
they are subject to random sampling error. It can be seen that even quite a large 
proportion of wealthy households live in homes with low Council Tax bands, while 
very few poor households live in homes with high Council Tax bands. 
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Table 4.3 shows the distribution of income deciles according to Council Tax band 
among English households in the Family Expenditure Survey 2001: 
 
























10.9%  11.2%  9.9% 10.0% 11.4% 11.4% 10.5% 9.6% 8.7% 6.4% 
Band 
B 
7.9% 8.6% 6.3% 10.5% 9.2% 13.4% 13.4% 11.2%  10.7% 8.7% 
Band 
C 
7.8% 5.9% 10.0%  10.7% 9.0% 10.7% 10.2% 12.7%  9.5% 13.7%
Band 
D 
4.7% 7.3% 5.9% 7.3% 8.9% 9.3% 13.4% 11.2%  13.6% 18.5%
Band 
E 
5.4% 5.8% 9.3% 6.2% 5.4% 10.4% 10.8% 8.5% 14.7% 23.6%
Band 
F 
4.3% 4.3% 7.9% 4.3% 9.3% 8.6% 12.9% 12.1%  12.1% 24.3%
Band 
G 
5.6% 4.5% 5.6% 10.1% 4.5% 11.2% 7.9% 13.5%  19.1% 18.0%
Band 
H 
0% 0% 12.5%  6.3%  12.5% 0% 18.8% 12.5%  25.0% 12.5%
 
The figures given for the higher Council Tax bands in Table 4.2 should be treated 
with extreme caution as there were too few households in those bands to give 
statistically reliable results. However, it can be seen that the correlation between 
income and Council Tax band is not as high as might be expected. It can be seen that 
rich households are only somewhat under-represented among households in the 
lowest bands, while poor households are very under-represented among households in 
the highest bands. 
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Regression analysis shows that the correlation between Council Tax band and energy 
expenditure is 0.261, so 26.1% of the variance in energy expenditure is reflected in 
the Council Tax band. The relationship between Council Tax bands and energy 
expenditure is described in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4  Annual fuel bills by council tax band 
 
     Annual  domestic  fuel  bills  (£) 
Council Tax band  20
th percentile  Median   80
th percentile 
A 242.35  443.04  699.92 
B 300.04  510.12  728.21 
C 355.68  545.48  780.00 
D 384.28  593.84  851.24 
E 468.58  672.36  942.03 
F 564.20  800.28  1115.92 
G 600.08  900.12  1333.44 
H 633.78  1116.44  2352.48 
 
It can be seen that energy expenditure (and hence carbon emissions) rises quite 
rapidly through the Council Tax bands. Even so, there is not insignificant overlap 
between the highest bills in Band A and the lowest bills in Band H. It must be borne 
in mind that less than 10% of households live in properties in the top three bands. 
Nonetheless, the Council Tax incentive scheme would tend to apply first to 
households with higher bills, and therefore present greater opportunities for early 
cost-effective energy-saving measures. 
 
Thirty percent of Council Tax payers in England are tenants (ODPM, 2002). It would 
not be fair to expect them to pay for energy efficiency improvements to the properties 
they live in or for them to have to pay a Council Tax surcharge because their landlord 
did not pay for the necessary improvements. One solution would be to give tenants the 
right to deduct any imposed Council Tax surcharge from their rent. In that way, the 
responsibility for making the improvements would be transferred from the tenants to 
the landlords with whom it should belong. 
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Once houses had been made energy efficient there would be little continuing rationale 
for the winter fuel payment to those over 60. It is currently £200 per household per 
annum or £100 per person if more than two eligible people live in the household. It 
could be linked into the energy efficiency programme by providing all eligible 
households with a one-off maximum grant of £2000 towards the cost of energy saving 
measures at the time when their home fell under the requirement to institute all cost 
effective measures. Thereafter, those living in the house would not be entitled to the 
payment, the effect of which would be that winter fuel payments would gradually be 
phased out. 
 
The carbon savings which would results from implementing all cost-effective 
household energy efficiency improvements are summarised in Table 4.5. 
 













9 2.9  2.5 
Low E glazing  20  0.6  0.6 
Loft  insulation  7.5 0.9 0.5 
Tank/pipe 
insulation 
9 0.5  0.4 
Draught-proofing 6  0.2  0.2 
Boilers 15  2.5  2.5 
Heating controls  7  0.7  0.6 
    
TOTAL   8.3  7.3 
(derived from EST 2001, p.18) 
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Low E glazing (which has recently been incorporated into building regulations) and 
double glazing in general are only cost effective when windows have to be replaced 
anyway. Upgrading boilers is also only cost effective near the end of life of boilers. It 
has not been possible to determine to what extent such measures could be included in 
the incentive scheme. Secondary glazing is cost effective, but it has not been possible 
to obtain figures for the cost. Taking these measures out, the other measures total 
4.2MtC/year, equivalent to 10% of household carbon emissions.  
 
In addition, it is estimated that there is the potential for 0.7 MtC/year of reductions 
from compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs, assuming 4 bulbs per household) and 1.5 
MtC/year from more efficient appliances. These measures probably could not be 
included in the scheme because of enforcement difficulties, but information about 
them and illustrative potential financial savings could be made available through the 
audit and, perhaps, CFLs made available for purchase at the time any improvements 
were being made. 
 
The costs, savings and rate of return of all cost-effective measures that could be 
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Table  4.6  Financial implications of implementing all cost-effective energy 































9  300 2700  96  864 32  11892 
Low E 
glazing 
20          
Loft 
insulation 
7.5  200 1500  40  300 20  4130 
Tank/pipe 
insulation 
9  35 315  15 135  42  1803 
Draught-
proofing 
6  85 510  10 60 5  482 
Boilers  15          
Heating 
controls 
7  200 1400  21  147 6  1427 
            
TOTAL     6425   1506  23  19734 
(derived from EST 2001, pp. 19-20) 
 
The measures would cost householders £6.4 billion, but would save them a net present 
value of £19.7 billion pounds. The average rate of return to householders would be 
23%. 
 
The limiting factor for the implementation of such measures is the capacity of 
installers. It would be necessary to have a great many more installers than there are at 
present. The current supply of installers more or less matches present demand. 
However, it does not take a long time for someone to be trained, so an increase in 
demand could be expected to quickly lead to an increase in supply. The experience of  
59   
the Energy Efficiency Standards of Performance (EESOP) scheme was that one job-
year involved costs of £45,000 (£25,700 for labour costs plus £19,300 materials costs) 
per direct job, or £39,000 per job when indirect jobs are included (Association for the 
Conservation of Energy, 1997). These figures are from 1997, so a reasonable estimate 
would be that about £55,000 of expenditure would generate one direct job. If a £6.4 
billion programme of work was conducted over ten years, that would be £640 million 
a year, implying about 11,500 direct jobs. When indirect jobs are included, the 
number of jobs would rise to about 13,500. However, about £1.3 billion of 
expenditure could be expected over ten years  under business as usual (EST 2001), or 
£130 million a year, so the net number of direct jobs created (and additional installers 
required) would be about 9,000 and the net number of direct and indirect jobs would 
be about 11,000. 
 
Economic instruments should not be used to the exclusion of other measures. There is 
a case for increasing the efficiency standards of domestic boilers and other heating 
systems. A number of factors hold back the use of condensing boilers in the UK 
compared to other countries like the Netherlands and Germany, but the main problem 
is a lack of suitably trained installers. There need to be subsidies to promote the 
training of installers, as in the Netherlands. Condensing boilers are more difficult to 
install than non-condensing boilers and they cannot be installed in all homes. 
However, the standards for non-condensing boilers could be increased. 
 
Through the above incentive scheme the great majority of homes in England and 
Wales (and Scotland and Northern Ireland if their devolved governments decided on 
similar schemes), which are currently among the most energy inefficient in northern 
Europe (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2000), could be brought up 
to cost-effective levels of energy efficiency by the middle of the next decade. Fuel 
poverty would be reduced to a fraction of its current level and confined to houses 
which were very expensive to make energy efficient. Carbon emissions from 
household energy use would be likely to be reduced by 10% from current levels, at no 
net cost to the taxpayer (apart from the small administrative cost of the scheme) and 
with very considerable financial benefits to most householders. The only losers would 
be those householders who wished to continue to exercise their right to use energy in 
their homes inefficiently, or those whose dislike of the process of upgrading their  
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home (and the inevitable administration and possible disruption this might cause) 
exceeded the net financial benefit they would receive. Their costs might be considered 
justified in the light of their excess contribution to climate change.  
 
Few other public policies have such a positive overall generation and distribution of 
economic, social and environmental benefits. It is an indication of the low political 
priority that is still given to climate change that such a scheme is still not being given 
serious political consideration. 
 
4.2.2 Stamp  duty 
 
Home improvement measures are often carried out when people move house. This 
would therefore often be a convenient time for householders to carry out energy 
efficiency improvements. The Council Tax incentive described in the previous section 
could be supplemented by a similar incentive (only applicable to properties which 
were not already certified as energy efficient) imposed through Stamp Duty at the 
time of sale. 
 
Stamp Duty is levied at the time of sale of a property dependent on the value of the 
property. The threshold is £60,000. Properties worth between £60,000 and £250,000 
are taxed at 1% of the value. Properties worth between £250,000 and £500,000 are 
taxed at 3% of the value. Properties worth over £500,000 are taxed at 4% of the value. 
The Energy Saving Trust has proposed (EST 2002, p.14) that households which carry 
out specified energy efficiency improvements within 12 months of the sale 
completion should receive a rebate on their Stamp Duty. Such a proposal both seems 
to run counter to the Polluter Pays Principle (which has a presumption against 
subsidising polluters to reduce their pollution) and does not take account of the fact 
that the improvements will actually save the households money.  
 
The proposal put forward here is that all house sales would attract a surcharge on 
Stamp Duty equivalent to 1% of the value of the property, which would become 
payable a year after the sale was completed, unless the householder could provide an 
energy efficiency certificate showing that all cost-effective energy efficiency  
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measures had been carried out in the intervening year (in a similar process to the 
Council Tax proposal). During this year the householder would not be subject to any 
Council Tax surcharge which might have been inherited from the previous 
householder, although this would be imposed without a further notification period if 
the measures were not carried out by the time the Council Tax was set following the 
payment of the Stamp Duty surcharge (which of course would only itself be paid if 
the measures remained unimplemented for 12 months). 
 
The advantages of combining this measure with that involving Council Tax are as 
follows: 
•  It accelerates the process of increasing household energy efficiency, especially 
for households in lower-priced properties. This might be important with 
reference to the achievement of the Government’s 2010 carbon emissions 
targets. 
•  It provides an incentive to implement energy-efficiency measures at a 
convenient time, irrespective of the Council Tax band (otherwise band A 
properties, for example, will not have such an incentive for several years). 
•  It provides a means of giving a year to achieve energy efficiency without a 
surcharge, when people move house, irrespective of when they move in 
relation to the Council Tax year, without giving a new period of Council Tax 
surcharge-free notification for houses which have already attracted a 
surcharge. 
 
This policy measure is likely to become little used once the Council Tax surcharge 
has been in place for a number of years and very few properties that can cost-
effectively be made energy efficient remain. 
 
The proposal is attractive because it is less intrusive than the Council Tax measure, 
but it cannot be relied upon as the main measure because much of the housing stock is 
surprisingly slow moving. People change mortgages on average every seven years, 
but the average length of stay is 13 years. It is 14.6 years in the owner-occupied 
sector, 11.5 years in the social rented sector and 5.7 years in the private rented sector 
(Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, personal communication). However, some  
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homes tend to change hands much more frequently than others. The Survey of English 
Housing shows tenure varies as follows: 
 
Length of residence    
Less than 1 year  7% 
1-3 years  14% 
3-5 years  9% 
5-10 years  16% 
10-20 years   26% 
20-40 years  22% 
More than 40 years  6% 
 
It takes over 10 years for more than half of households to move, over 20 years for 
75% to move and about 35 years for 90% to move. 
 
Over the ten years of the Council Tax measure, it can be expected that about 27% of 
households would be reached by the Stamp Duty measure before they are reached by 
the Council Tax measure (assuming that properties of different values are equally 
likely to change hands). It will on average bring forward measures in those 
households by two years – equivalent in terms of carbon saving to the ten-year 
programme being completed in 9.5 years. 
 
It is not only the building fabric that could be addressed through economic 
instruments. They could be used to promote other forms of household energy 
efficiency. In July 2002, the Treasury launched a consultation on economic 
instruments to improve household energy efficiency (HM Treasury 2002). A tax on 
domestic energy was ruled out, but suggestions were invited for other economic 
instruments that could be used to improve household energy efficiency. A number of 
submissions suggested the use of incentives based around Stamp Duty and Council 
Tax, but in the Treasury’s follow up consultation document on specific measures, 
published in August 2003, it dismissed using Stamp Duty as ‘administratively 
complex and giv[ing] weak signals’ (HM Treasury 2003, p. 9). The suggestion of a 
variation in Council Tax was not even mentioned in the second consultation 
document. Instead, the focus was on reducing the rate of VAT for energy efficient  
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products and measures and a tax allowance to encourage private landlords to insulate 
properties. Such measures could complement a more comprehensive scheme such as 
that described above, but by themselves they would do little to meet the 
Government’s carbon reduction targets and are not further discussed here. 
 
4.3  Beyond the ten-year programme 
 
The ten-year programme described in the previous sections would address fuel 
poverty through an expanded and better-directed Warm Front scheme and would 
address the energy efficiency of the rest of the national housing stock through the 
measures related to Council Tax and Stamp Duty. Combined with improvements in 
the standards for the efficiency of boilers (which have an average lifespan of about 15 
years) that are scheduled for 2006 so that condensing boilers take over the market, it 
would bring most of the housing stock up to quite a high standard, of around SAP 70.  
 
However, two problems would remain. The first is that the one-third of houses with 
solid walls would not have been brought up to such a high standard. Whereas the 
indicative fuel costs for a typical semi-detached home with cavity walls and a gas 
supply that has undertaken all the measures are around £400 a year, the indicative 
costs for a similar home with solid walls (and no wall insulation) are around £500 a 
year. However, this assumes the installation of an efficient condensing boiler. If 
electrical heating is the only practical option then bills would still be over £900 a year 
with all conventional insulation measures. Solid wall insulation would bring bills 
down to around £600 a year, which is about the same as a similar house with electrical 
heating and filled cavities (Iles 2002). The elimination of fuel poverty is going to 
require not only insulation, but the replacement of electric heating with central 
heating. 
 
However, at the end of the ten-year programme, all the solid walled and electrically 
heated houses will have been identified. Presently, there is no way of knowing who is 
in fuel poverty because nothing is known about the thermal characteristics of a 
particular address. The data collected by local councils in the ten-year programme will 
be used to create a national database about the thermal characteristics of every address  
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in the country. It will then be a simple matter to match this with every benefit and tax 
credit claim and target those households with electric heating for gas central heating if 
possible and those in solid walled homes for wall insulation measures. 
 
The second problem concerns how to prevent household energy use and carbon 
emissions from increasing with rising incomes, following the completion of the ten-
year programme of energy efficiency improvements. In the absence of rising energy 
prices this problem could only be addressed through an escalating domestic carbon or 
energy tax, to ensure that increases in energy prices matched growing incomes. 
 
Such a tax would have the further advantage of providing revenues which could be 
used to upgrade hard-to-heat homes, as described in the previous paragraphs. At the 
same rate as the Climate Change Levy, a household carbon tax would raise revenues 
of around £1 billion per annum which could be hypothecated to home energy 
efficiency measures. Low-income households in hard-to-heat homes prior to 
upgrading could be allowed to claim for a temporary exemption from the carbon tax 
until the necessary measures had been carried out. The Council Tax and Stamp Duty 
schemes could also continue for another round. By that time, technology would have 
advanced and this and the carbon tax would have made further household energy 
efficiency improvements cost-effective. 
 
The second round of the programme could also use the revenues from the carbon tax 
to fund solid wall insulation and/or central heating for low income households and 
provide subsidies for those on medium incomes, bearing in mind the expensiveness of 
these measures. 
 
At the end of the second round of the programme, over another ten years, almost all 
homes would be close to the SAP 70 standard. The housing stock would have been 
raised to such a standard that fuel poverty would be almost impossible except in cases 
of severe under-occupation. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
The first major conclusion of this project is that, contrary to the starting hypothesis on 
which the first stage of the research was based, it is not possible to use the benefits 
system to compensate low-income households for any household carbon tax that 
might be introduced to reduce CO2 emissions. The reason for this is that there is too 
wide a variation in energy use in the low-income deciles. Even though a 
compensation scheme can be constructed which on average is very progressive (i.e. 
makes the average low-income household better off), a minimum of a fifth of these 
households remain losers (even assuming full take up of benefits), of which a 
significant proportion will be pensioners and households with children. These are the 
households with the highest fuel expenditures in the low-income deciles (i.e. they are 
those deepest in fuel poverty), and those with pensioners and children are especially 
vulnerable to this condition. A policy that worsened their condition would not be 
perceived as fair, and would be most unlikely to be considered either socially 
desirable or politically feasible. 
 
One response to this situation would be to say that little can be done to incentivise 
households to improve the energy efficiency of their dwellings until the fuel poverty 
problem has been resolved. To date this appears to have been the Government’s 
approach to this issue. Certainly policies to encourage household energy efficiency 
overwhelmingly focus on fuel poor, rather than non-fuel poor, households. That is not 
the response suggested in this paper. 
 
Rather, the paper proposes using two taxes - Council Tax and Stamp Duty - to 
encourage households to install all cost-effective energy efficiency measures. The 
suggested approach, implemented over ten years, would yield significant 
environmental, economic and social benefits. It would save a minimum of 10% of 
household carbon emissions, and could stimulate about the same savings again (from 
efficient boilers, appliances and lightbulbs) if the information provided through the 
approach, complemented by other policies, caused significant take up in these other  
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areas, which lie outside the actual scheme that is suggested. Such carbon savings 
would ensure that households contribute to the achievement of the Government’s 
carbon reduction targets, rather than to their non-achievement, as seems likely at 
present. 
 
Economically, the scheme proposed would result in £6.4 billion of investment by 
households in energy efficiency measures, which would have an average payback 
period of about four years and, over their lifetime, save £19.7 billion (in present value 
terms) in household energy expenditures. The proposed scheme therefore yields 
substantial economic benefits. 
 
A social benefit of this investment would be that many households currently in fuel 
poverty would be brought out of it. A further social benefit would that the households 
where fuel poverty remained would be identified, as they are not at present. This 
would provide the information base for the second ten-year programme, which would 
tackle the energy inefficiency of hard-to-heat homes (e.g. those with solid walls), 
using the revenues from a carbon tax on the energy use of those households which 
were already energy efficient. The carbon tax would also encourage the upgrading of 
home energy efficiency, as new technologies became available, and both discourage 
continually rising carbon-based energy consumption, and encourage the installation of 
non-carbon household energy technologies (such as solar water heating or 
photovoltaic panels). Because the implemented energy efficiency measures would 
have greatly reduced the amount of energy required to keep warm, it would be 
possible in this case to compensate low-income households through the benefit system 
for their carbon tax payments, to ensure that they were not made worse off. 
 
After twenty years of these policies, the problem of fuel poverty would be resolved, 
because the UK housing stock would be of an energy efficiency that would render it 
effectively impossible (as is the case, in terms of political perception at least, in 
mainland northern Europe). Household energy would be considerably more expensive 
than it is now. But household expenditure on energy would be lower, both because 
households would need to use much less to obtain their desired level of service 
(especially because of houses’ far greater retention of heat, but also because of the 
penetration of more efficient appliances) and because far more households would  
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have installed domestic solar technologies (the energy from which would, of course, 
carry no carbon tax).  
 
In summary, therefore, for the first ten years the above strategy would be financially 
neutral or positive for nearly everyone. The poor would be protected and far fewer 
people would be in fuel poverty. Everyone would be making energy efficiency 
investments which saved them money and made them more comfortable. The UK 
housing stock, over a period of a decade, would stop being a national efficiency 
disgrace. Household carbon emissions would be significantly lower than they are now 
(rather than higher, as they seem likely to be on current policies). After twenty years, 
even with the introduction of a carbon tax, the great majority of people would still be 
better off (depending on how fast the carbon tax was increased and how people 
responded to it), and the poor would still be protected. Fuel poverty would have been 
eliminated and the UK housing stock would be among the most energy efficient 
(instead of the least efficient) in northern Europe. 
 
It is a measure of the lack of public awareness of the threat of climate change, and of a 
commitment to mitigate, that even a policy approach with such wide economic, social 
and environmental benefits would not be politically uncontentious. In particular, the 
penalties for not implementing energy efficiency measures, and perhaps the disruption 
involved in doing so, would be likely to be resented. Probably there needs to be 
greater public awareness of climate change, and a greater willingness to address it, 
than there is now for the long-term gains of the policy outlined here to be regarded as 
surely worth any inconvenience in the transition as the works are actually carried out.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Using the Bradmill equivalent income scale where the equivalent income expresses a standard of 
living equivalent to a two-adult household with the income shown. 
2 Using the Bradmill equivalent income scale where the equivalent income expresses a standard of 
living equivalent to a two-adult household with the income shown. 
3 The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Holly Sutherland at Cambridge University in 
the use of her POLIMOD model of the tax-benefits system linked to the FES. 
 
4 Internal rate of return 
5 Present value, discounted at 6% 